Chapter III

Divorce and Remarriage Texts

in Jesus' Teaching

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The Force of the Word "Another"

Barring Matt. 5:32, New Testament passages on divorce and remarriage specifically mention "another" party in addition to the married couple. These passages cannot be properly understood without recognizing that someone outside the original marriage has entered the picture:

Matt. 19:9: "And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another (allen), committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery."

Mark 10:11-12: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another (allen), committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another (allon), she committeth adultery."

Luke 16:18: "Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another (heteron), committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery."

Paul likewise mentions "another" person in Rom. 7:3: "So then if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man (andri hetero), she shall be called an adulteress." Stressing the significance of the word "another," Woods writes:

. . . He who puts away his wife and marries 'another,' is not by these words forbidden to return to his former companion because the word 'another'...does not include the first wife. The English definition of 'another' is, 'different or distinct from the first considered' (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.)... The prohibition in the words, 'and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery,' is there because any marriage, not broken because of fornication to 'another' (not the same one), is prohibited. Therefore, to extend this prohibition to embrace one not included in 'another' is unwarranted.

Jesus taught in Matt. 19:9 that one who divorces his wife for reasons other than fornication and marries another woman commits adultery. He did not merely say that one who divorces his wife for reasons other than fornication and marries again commits adultery; He specifically stated that marrying another after unlawful divorce is adultery. Warren recognizes this fact: "The guilty party is not free to marry another (Matt. 5:32; 19:9)." Jack Evans referred to "the Biblical fact that the guilty party may not 'marry another.'" Campbell stated that "a man must both leave or dismiss his wife and marry another, in order to incur the charge preferred by our Lord, of adultery." But the remarriage of the guilty party to the former mate is not under consideration in Matt. 19:9. This passage does not even mention, much less forbid, such a remarriage. The force of the word "another" is ignored by those holding the contradictory view. Any appeal to Matt. 19:9 in an attempt to prove that a man cannot remarry the woman he has divorced is untenable.

"Whosoever": Qualified or Unqualified?

Four parties are involved in the situation described in Matt. 5:32, Matt. 19:9, and Luke 16:18: (1) the man who divorces his wife: the first "whosoever"; (2) the woman this man later marries: "another"; (3) the wife who was divorced: "her which is put away"; (4) the man who marries the divorced wife: the second "whosoever." Two men and two women are mentioned. Obviously, the first man (the "whosoever" who divorced his wife) is distinct from the second man (the "whosoever" who marries this divorced wife), just as the first woman ("her which is divorced") is distinct from the second woman ("another"). Matt. 5:32b "contemplates the remarriage of the divorced woman to a second 'husband.'" Lanier wrote that two "whosoevers" are mentioned in Matt. 5:32. Deaver admits that "there are two 'whosoevers' who commit adultery" in Matt. 19:9.

When these simple facts are ignored, men sometimes "assume that the person who 'puts away' his wife in Matt. 19:9 is included in the 'whoso' of the final clause." Connally makes this assumption: "The act of remarriage by the fornicator to anyone, ever, is forbidden (Matt. 19:9b)." Deaver writes, "All persons who have married a having-been-put-away companion are persons who keep on committing adultery." According to Deaver and Connally, Jesus taught that whoever marries a divorced woman - even the husband who divorced her - commits adultery. Rather than properly distinguishing between the second "whosoever" and the first, they assert that it includes the first.

That this view is a strained attempt at exegesis arising from an effort to prove what Jesus did not teach is evident from Luke's parallel account: "whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery" (Luke 16:18b). This woman was put away "from her husband" (apo andros). This qualifying phrase limits the "whosoever" marrying this woman to someone other than the husband who divorced her. The same phrase occurs in Lev. 21:7: "neither shall they take a woman put away from her husband." Given Connally and Deaver's position, its use in Luke 16:18b makes no sense. Marshall recognizes this distinction: "The situation here is that of a man...who marries a woman divorced apo andros (Lk. Only; cf. Mk. 10:12); he is also committing adultery, ie., against the first husband...the second husband of a divorced woman is regarded as offending against the first husband." The following diagram illustrates this distinction:

"Put Away": For What Cause?

The statement "and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery" (Matt. 5:32b) is from kai hos ean apolelumenen gamese moichatai. Apolelumenen is a perfect passive participle of apoluo, to "let go, send away, dismiss," used here of divorce. Matt: 19:9b similarly reads kai ho apolelumenen gamon moichatai, literally and the one who marries her that is put away commits adultery." Luke also uses apolelumenen with the addition of the words apo andros, "her that is put away from her husband" (Luke 16:18b). In each of these accounts, apolelumenen is anarthrous, ie., it is not preceded by the article. The perfect emphasizes the results of a completed action: the woman has been divorced and is in the state of having been divorced. In relation to the issue of the remarriage of a divorced couple, the reference of apolelumenen is central. The woman has been put away, but for what has she been put away? Do the words "put away" refer to a divorce for fornication, a divorce for reasons other than fornication, or both?

Several commentators believe that apolelumenen refers to one put away for reasons other than fornication. Attempts to justify this position are often based on the argument that the woman in Matt. 19:9b is still the wife of her former husband, otherwise the one marrying her could not commit adultery. The divorce, then, must have been unlawful (for reasons other than fornication). Broadus argues that unless the divorce was for fornication, the woman in marrying another "would be committing adultery, as she would still be, in the view of the divine law, the first husband's wife." Whedon holds that she was "unlawfully divorced, and so not divorced at all" and that she is "still bound by an unbroken marriage tie to her former husband." Mansel explained, "Whoever marries the divorced woman commits adultery, because she is still the wife of another man." The assumption of this argument is that adultery cannot occur when a divorced fornicator marries another because she is no longer married to the first husband, As to why this assumption is false, more will be said later.

An alleged justification of the attempt to limit apolelumenen to unscripturallv divorced persons is the claim that the exceptive phrase of Matt. 19:9 ("except it be for fornication," me epi porneia) modifies apolelumenen as well as apoluse. Guy Duty holds this view:

The argument of no remarriage interpreters is that the exception does not extend to the clause 'and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.' I will try to prove to you that it does.

In the Greek sentence, as in the English, it does not matter which position in the sentence the exception takes. It can be at the beginning, middle, or end, and the meaning of the law remains the same. But the exception sounds better in the middle of the Greek sentence and it is the proper place for it to be. The exception can be removed from its usual position and placed in an unusual position in the sentence without changing its bearing on both clauses. On the Position of Words in the Sentence, see A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, A. T. Robertson, MA., D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., p. 417.

We now demonstrate the meaning of except.

a.) Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery. Matt. 19:9

b.) Except it be for fornication, whosoever shall put away his wife, and shall marry another, committeth adultery, and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

c.) Whosoever shall put away his wife, and shall marry another committeth adultery; and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery, except it be for fornication.

Duty fails to observe that Robertson makes a distinction between English and Greek. In English, the sense of a sentence is largely determined by word order; in Greek, while there is greater liberty in word order, the inflectional endings indicate the use of the words. Robertson states,

In English it is common to see words in the wrong place that make absurd bungles, as this, for instance: 'The man rode a horse with a black hat.' In Greek one may say philei ho pater ton huion, ho pater philei ton huion, or philei ton huion ho pater, according to the stress in the mind of the speaker.

Duty misses Robertson's point. It is the Greek writer who enjoyed this liberty of word order, not the interpreter. When the Holy Spirit guided Matthew in his writing of 5:32 and 19:9 (II Tim. 3:16; II Pet. 1:20-21; I Cor. 2:9-13; 14:37), the word order was set. The exegete does not have the liberty to rearrange the text. Besides, Matt. 19:9 is made up of two clauses, each of which can stand by itself as a sentence. The first clause has the exceptive phrase; the second clause does not. Injecting the prepositional phrase of Matt. 19:9a into Matt. 19:9b is a grammatically unwarranted procedure. Commenting on Matt. 5:32, Lanier stressed that "the phrase 'apart from a matter of fornication' is an adverbial phrase modifying the verb 'dismissing.' Since it occurs but once in the sentence, it cannot be made to modify another verb, or even a participle, in the next clause."

Lewis Hale has argued extensively that apolelumenen is modified by the exceptive phrase. He claims that "the text does say that if a man marries her when she is thus put away (not for fornication), he commits adultery." Attempting to justify this move by an alleged diagram, he explained:

Here is what I believe to be a correct diagram of Matt. 19:9, as it appears in the Greek text. You will note that ma epi porneia is found a second time on dotted lines to indicate that it is understood to modify apolelumenen. In the paragraph following the diagram, Dean Alford is quoted in justification of this action in both Matt. 5:32 and 19:9.

You will note that it is a woman dismissed apart from a matter of fornication that is made to commit adultery. That is why any man who marries such a dismissed woman also commits adultery. He marries a woman whose marriage bond is not broken, thus, he is marrying another man's wife. If she commits adultery by marrying him, he commits adultery by marrying her. It is that simple.

You will note in the amended diagram that the phrase except for fornication appears twice, once as explicitly stated, once as being understood. . .

A diagram is a grammatical tool which shows the relationships of words in a sentence. Strictly speaking, it employs only the words which occur in the sentence. One is not at liberty to paraphrase, explain, or duplicate these words and then add them to the diagram. The claim that the meaning of certain words is "understood" is irrelevant. Only the words of the sentence themselves, not their meanings, are to appear in a diagram. Besides, Hale is begging the question in arguing that me epi porneia is "understood" to modify apolelumenen. Where is the proof that this grammatical qualification exists? Hale believes it is a matter of "implication":

All of this is saying that to marry a woman divorced apart from a matter of fornication is to commit adultery. What does it say about marrying a woman who has been put away because of her fornication? Except by implication, nothing. It will not suffice to say that 'Surely the Lord did not mean to allow such a sinful woman the privilege of remarriage.' We must decide what the Lord means by examining the text. Teaching that is implicit is just as binding as teaching that is explicit. However, we must make very sure as to what is implied and what is not implied. Our prejudices may allow us to see implications that do not exist. . .

What did Jesus say about remarriage when fornication was the basis of dissolving the first marriage? Except by implication, nothing. However, he did say 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery' (Matt. 19:9). By implication this says, 'Whosoever shall put away his wife for fornication and shall marry another does not commit adultery. And whoso marrieth her which is put away does not commit adultery.' To negate the condition of adultery in one case but not the other does not agree with logic or scripture.

Hale's statements reveal a misunderstanding of the nature of implication. To say that one proposition implies another proposition is to say that the second proposition must follow from the first. If A implies B and A is true, then B must be true — it is impossible for B to be false if A is true. If Hale's position is implied by Matt. 19:9, then the evidence must demand the conclusion that his position is correct. But his evidence is inadequate, resting on the assumption that apolelumenen is modified by the exceptive phrase. The case for this qualification is based largely on quotations from commentators. Specifically, Hale relies heavily on Alford:

Notice, as on ch. 5:32, apolelumenen without the art., and thus logically confined to the case of her who has been divorced me epi porneia. This not having been seen, expositors (e.g., of late Bp. Wordsworth) have fallen into the mistake of supposing that the dictum applies to the marrying of a woman divorced epi porneia, which grammatically would require ten apolelumenen. The proper English way of rendering the words as it now stands, would be a woman thus divorced, viz., me epi porneia.

In light of this argument, Carson's warning is appropriate: "The exegete must be careful regarding conclusions drawn from the mere presence or absence of an article." Robertson notes that

The word may be either definite or indefinite when the article is absent. The context and history of the phrase in question must decide. The translation of the expression into English or German is not determined by mere absence of the Greek article. If the word is indefinite, as in Jo. 4:27, 6:68, no article, of course, occurs. But the article is absent in a good many definite phrases also.

Also, anarthrous nouns or substantives emphasize quality or character (cf. Jn. 1:1, theos en ho logos). Moulton observes, "For exegesis, there are a few of the finer points of Greek which need more constant attention than this omission of the article when the writer would lay stress on the quality or character of the object." Dana and Mantey note that "the articular construction emphasizes identity; the anarthrous construction emphasizes character." Accordingly, anarthrous apolelumenen stresses the character of the woman: she is a divorced person. Whether apolelumenen is definite or indefinite is, as Robertson notes, to be determined by the context. Contrary to Alford's claim, nothing in the context limits apolelumenen to the case of one divorced me epi porneia, especially since this qualifying phrase is absent from Matt: 19:9b. The cause of the divorce in apolelumenen cannot be determined by the mere absence of the article. Yet, strangely enough, arguments based on the article have been advanced from both sides of the issue. Alford claims that the hypothetical ten apolelumenen would denote a woman divorced epi porneia; McCord argues that it would denote the woman divorced me epi porneia. Neither of these presented evidence for these assertions.

Alford's suggestion that apolelumenen in Matt. 5:32b should be rendered "a woman thus divorced" has been adopted in several translations. The NEB and NIV read "a woman so divorced." Williams (The New Testament in the Language of the People) translates apolelumenen "a wife who is thus divorced." Weymouth renders it "her when so divorced." Barclay likewise translates the participle "a woman who has been so divorced." These additions of the adverbs "so" and "thus" are unjustified. No adverbs such as houtos ("thus, so, in this manner") are present in the Greek to modify apolelumenen.

Another complication arises from Alford's view of apolelumenen. He holds that anarthrous apolelumenen denotes a woman divorced me epi porneia and that articular apolelumenen would denote a woman divorced epi porneia. Given his view, how could Jesus have spoken of a divorced woman in general—whether for fornication or some other reason? Alford's position leaves no room for this possibility.

It is equally ungrammatical to assert that apolelumenen is limited to one divorced epi porneia. Epi porneia cannot justifiably be injected into Matt. 19:9b any more than me epi porneia. The exceptive phrase occurs neither in whole nor in part in the last clause of Matt. 19:9. It is not apolelumenen me epi porneia or apolelumenen epi porneia; it is simply apolelumenen. If "her which is put away" refers exclusively to the woman divorced for fornication, then Jesus did not address the case of a man marrying a woman divorced for reasons other than fornication in Matt. 5:32b and 19:9b. Matt. 19:9a addresses putting away for fornication and putting away for reasons other than fornication; Matt. 19:9b addresses marrying one who has been put away for fornication and one who has been put away for reasons other than fornication. The unqualified substantive participle apolelumenen is a general term denoting one who has been put away for any cause. Deaver admits that apolelumenen carries this force:

...the Lord said nothing about marrying her that is put away on grounds other than fornication, and the Lord said nothing about marrying her that is put away for fornication. The Lord said 'The man who has married a having-been-put-away woman keeps on committing adultery.'

Bruce is likewise correct in observing that Matt. 19:9b "states unqualifiedly that to marry a dismissed wife is adultery."

The verb apoluo is not used exclusively of scriptural divorces (those for the cause of fornication) in divorce and remarriage texts. In Matt. 19:9 it is not limited to the concept of "complete dissolution of the marriage bond" implying "the right of remarriage" for the innocent party. Both scriptural and unscriptural divorces are covered by the teaching of Jesus in Matt.19:9a. In a divorce where the stated exception has occurred, the innocent party has the right to marry again and the marriage bond is dissolved. Neither party is free to marry another in an unscriptural divorce. The latter is a divorce only in a legal sense; the marriage bond in this case is not dissolved. Apoluo is used to denote both cases.

Thus, there is no contextual justification for limiting apolelumenen to one divorced for fornication, and there is nothing intrinsic in the meaning of apoluo which confines Matt. 19:9b to marrying a person so divorced. The fact that apolelumenen is unqualified and refers both to those divorced scripturally and those divorced unscripturally proves the major premise in the basic argument of the thesis. One cannot consistently affirm the contradictory view while teaching that an unscripturally divorced couple may be reunited.

The Nature of Adultery

A key element in the refutation of the contradictory view is the meaning of the word adultery in divorce and remarriage texts. "Adultery" is commonly defined as "the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is married to a third person." "As to the specific guilt of adultery, it adds a sin against justice to the intrinsically grave malice of fornication, which in itself is a deordination of sex from its true and appointed end." Foley states that "adultery is sinful because it is a kind of theft." The following definition expounds upon the nature of biblical adultery:

Adultery is illicit sex outside marriage and, as well, in the Old Testament by the betrothed with a third party prior to the consummation of marriage . . . The Old Testament teaches that God intended a single male and a single female to contract a permanent spiritual union, that is to say, monogamous marriage. Adultery is a violation of this union.

These definitions are basically correct but typically inexhaustive in that the adultery of Matt. 19:9b is not fully covered. In a divorce for sexual immorality, the marriage bond is dissolved, leaving the innocent party free to remarry. The use of the generic participle apolelumenen means that the guilty party in the divorce commits adultery by marrying another. Consideration of these facts leads to a difficult question: How can the divorced fornicator commit adultery in marrying another if she is no longer married to the first husband? Some have allowed their inability to satisfactorily answer this question to lead them to deny the plain teaching of Jesus in Matt. 19:9b. Underlying Hale's exegesis Matt. 13:9b is the assumption that the word adultery cannot legitimately be ascribed to the remarriage of a divorced fornicator to another person. Concerning the guilty party he states that "he is no longer married to anyone. He has no marriage bond to which he can be faithful. How could it be adultery to marry?" Bales argues similarly:

If the offending party can be forgiven by the Lord, when and if the person repents, must the guilty party remain unmarried? If remarriage is impossible, from a scriptural standpoint, it must be because: (1) the guilty party is still married to the innocent party, although the innocent party is not married to the guilty party. How is this possible? Or because: (2) God passed a law which states that the guilty party cannot remarry, but must do penance, as it were, for the rest of his or her life. Where is this law?

The questions these men pose arise from an incomplete definition of adultery. They fail to consider the possibility that this definition may require modification. Instead, they reason from the assumption that this definition is exhaustive and adopt a grammatically unjustified view of Matt. 19:9. But when God designates a relationship adultery, it is adulterous even if men are unable to understand why God referred to it as such. It is the definition of adultery assumed by Hale and Bales that needs reworking, not the words of Jesus in Matt. 19:9b.

The nature of adultery in the New Testament involves modification of the Old Testament concept of the term. The Hebrew word naaph is used to denote both literal (Prov. 6:32) and figurative (Jer. 3:9) adultery in the Old Testament, but it is never used to refer to remarriage after divorce. However, Jesus said that those who divorce and remarry unscripturally (Matt. 5:32; 19:9; Mk. 10:11-12; Lk. 16:18) commit adultery (moicheuo). Wenham refers to Matt. 5:27-32 as "Jesus' new definition of adultery." Chrysostom, after commenting on Matt. 5:27-28, said that Jesus in Matt. 5:32 "shows us yet another kind of adultery." Jesus' use of the word adultery modified the Old Testament application of the term. Consequently, it should not seem strange that the word is applied to the remarriage of the divorced fornicator to another party in Matt. 19:9b.

There is an interesting Old Testament parallel to the concept of adultery in Matt. 19:9b. This parallel concerns the special nature of the Jewish betrothal:

Betrothal with the ancient Hebrews was of a more formal and far more binding nature than the 'engagement' is with us. Indeed, it was esteemed a part of the transaction of marriage, and that the most binding part . . . Among the Jews the betrothal was so far regarded as binding that, if marriage should not take place, owing to the absconding of the bridegroom or the breach of contract on his part, the young woman could not be married to another man until she was liberated by a due process and a paper of divorce.

In accord with the Jewish concept of espousal, Joseph was minded to put away Mary during their betrothal (Matt. 1:18-19). But the betrothal was also a grave matter in that the sexual intercourse of a betrothed woman and another man was considered adultery. The word naaph in the Old Testament means "to have sexual intercourse with the wife or betrothed of another man, commit adultery" "An adulterer was, therefore, any man who had illicit intercourse with a married or betrothed woman; and an adulteress was a betrothed or married woman who had intercourse with any other man than her husband." That the concept of adultery in the Old Testament includes the sexual unfaithfulness of a betrothed person is evident from Deut. 22:22-24. No distinction is made in the punishment of a man found lying with a married woman (v.22) and a man who lay with a betrothed virgin (v.23-24). In each case, both the man and the woman were to be put to death, the punishment ordained by God for adultery (Lev. 20:10), not mere pre-marital sex.

The adultery of a betrothed Jew is to be understood in a prospective sense due to the gravity of the betrothal and the solemnity of the future marriage. But if the concept of adultery was applied prospectively with regard to marriage in the case of a betrothed person in the Old Testament, is it inconceivable that "adultery" is used retrospectively with regard to marriage in the case of a divorced fornicator in Matt. 19:9b? If the unmarried betrothed Jew could commit adultery, then it is not absurd to say that an unmarried divorced fornicator commits adultery by marrying another person.

Generally, explanations of the use of the word adultery in Matt. 19:9b neglect this Old Testament parallel. Deaver says that the divorced fornicator commits adultery because "the law of God does not allow the wife —the guilty party—to form another marriage union. The guilty party is still handcuffed to the law of God." Lusk argues that the idea in Matt. 19:9b is that of "adulteration" in the sense of perversion or rendering impure a relationship. As to why the guilty party's marriage to another is called adultery, he answers, "Because God so declared it in the explicit language of Jesus." Jackson explained that "a man can commit adultery just because God says he does. Marriage belongs to God." He states that the case in Mart. 19:9b is "divinely added" to the common definition of adultery. These explanations view the prohibition in Matt. 19:9b from a purely positive standpoint but fail to consider it from a moral viewpoint. God could have forbidden the remarriage in Matt. 19:9b without calling it adultery. The Israelites were not to marry those of other nations (Deut. 7:1-4), but the transgressing of this prohibition (e.g. Ezra 10:10) was not called adultery. Had Jesus simply said "Whoever marries a divorced woman transgresses the law of God," the prohibition would have been a case of pure positive law. But adultery is a transgression of moral law, involving the relationships of human beings to each other. Why, then, does the divorced fornicator commit adultery in remarrying another? Evidently, the marriage vows, the one-flesh covenant of marriage, the violation of this one-flesh agreement by the sin of fornication, and the dissolving of this union by divorce are matters so serious in the sight of God that the divorced fornicator is said to commit adultery in marrying another. As far as remarriage is concerned, the guilty party is viewed as if he/she were still married to the former mate, just as a betrothed Jew was looked upon as if he/she were already married to the future mate. But if these considerations are correct, and if the remarriage of a divorced fornicator to someone besides the former mate is adultery, then how could the remarriage of the divorced fornicator to the former mate be anything else but the opposite - a lawful, scriptural marriage?

While the meaning of adultery is modified in the New Testament, the element of a third party (someone other than the two who entered the marriage) remains inherent in its definition. Whether used in a literal or figurative sense in Scripture, adultery always involves this third party. Every use of naaph and its cognates in the Old Testament contains this basic idea. Literally, adultery involved a third party (Ex. 20:14; Lev. 20:10; Deut. 5:18; Job 24:15; Psa. 50:18; Prob. 6:32; 30:20; Isa, 57:3; Jer. 5;7; 7:9; 9:2; 23:10 14; 33:23; Hos. 7:1; 4:2, 13. 14; 7:4; Mal. 3: 5). An adulterer is "the man that committeth adultery with another man's wife" (Lev. 20:10). Figuratively, adultery occurred when the marriage of God and His people Israel was defiled by idolatrous worship (Jer. 3:8-9; 13;27; Eze. 16:32; U:33. 43, 45; Hos. 2:2). These passages cover all the Old Testament uses of naaph. The word adulteress in Prov. 6:26, from ishah ish, a man's wife, is used literally of an adulterous woman. Zanah is the more general Hebrew word, meaning to "commit fornication, be a harlot." Moicheuo and its cognates always involve a third party in the New Testament (Matt. 5:27-28, 32; 12:39; 15:19; 19:9, 18; Mark 7:21; 8:38; 10:11-12, 19; Luke 16:18; 18:11, 20; John 8:3; Rom. 2:22; 7;3; 13:9; I Cor. 6:9; Gal. 5:19; Heb. 13:4; Jas. 2:11; 4:4; II Pet. 2:14; Rev. 2:22). When used figuratively, adultery may involve a third party such as false teaching (Rev. 2:22), the world (Jas. 4:4), or hypocrisy and the traditions of men (Matt. 12:39; 16:4; Mk. 8:38). Porneia is a general term meaning "prostitution, unchastity, fornication, of every kind of unlawful sexual intercourse." Zanah and porneia may include adultery, but naaph and moicheuo are the specific terms for this act in Scripture. The biblical meaning is clear: "adultery" in Scripture always involves a third party.

The necessity of a third party in adultery is particularly relevant to the issue of a divorced fornicator remarrying the former mate. How can this remarriage be adultery when there is no third party? A divorced fornicator cannot commit adultery by remarrying the former mate. No third party is involved, and without a third party there can be no adultery.